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 1 
Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS 
Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia  
 
By Kirsten E. Schulze and Joseph Chinyong Liow 
 
On 14 January 2016 Indonesia’s capital Jakarta saw its first major jihadi violence 
since the bombing of the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in 2009. The attack on a 
Starbucks café and a nearby traffic police post in the Thamrin business district, which killed 8 
including the 4 attackers, emulated the marauding modus operandi of the Paris attacks only 
months earlier.
1
 It was claimed by the Islamic State or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and As-
Sham), stating that ‘soldiers of the Caliphate’ had ‘targeted a gathering of the citizens of the 
Crusader alliance’ and ‘those charged with protecting them’,2 but had been locally organised 
by members of Jemaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK), an organisation established as an 
‘umbrella’ for pro-ISIS jihadis in Indonesia.3 Several months later, on 28 June 2016, a 
grenade was tossed into the Movida Restaurant and Bar in Puchong, Selangor state, in 
Malaysia. The perpetrators of the attack, it was revealed, had received instructions from 
Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi, a Malaysian jihadi based in Syria fighting with ISIS.
4
 
A year later, pro-ISIS militants in the southern Philippines, including Indonesians and 
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 2 
Malaysians, laid siege to the town centre of Marawi city on the southern Philippine island of 
Mindanao.
5
  
Despite these attacks and the departure of an estimated 800 Indonesians and 100 
Malaysians to Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2017, Southeast Asia has not featured 
prominently in the literature on ISIS which has focused on the origins and rise of ISIS
6
  or on 
more specific aspects of the ISIS phenomenon, such as its savvy use of social media, its 
ideology, and its recruitment strategy.
7
 This literature, on the whole, has been Middle East-
centric in its discussion of ISIS and Eurocentric in its discussion of foreign fighters. 
Southeast Asian foreign fighters, jihadi groups or clerics are mentioned only in passing, if at 
all. For instance Christoph Reuter notes that there were Indonesian mujahidin and that they 
seemed to be better trained than those coming from Europe.
8
 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger 
mentions the pledges of allegiance to ISIS by Abu Sayyaf militants from the Philippines and 
Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir9 while David Kilcullen highlights the presence of 
extremists in Indonesia and Malaysia in generic fashion.
10
 Some of these passing references, 
moreover, are inaccurate revealing the lack of understanding of shifts and dynamics within 
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 3 
Indonesian jihadi circles. For instance, Abdel Bari Atwan erroneously states that ‘Islamic 
State has allies in Indonesia’s Jamaa Islamiyyah’.11  
This article examines the ISIS phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia in order to 
broaden the discussion of ISIS beyond its Middle Eastern core and its foreign fighters from 
the West. It aims to explain how, where, and why the transnational and local intersect as well 
as the role of religion, particularly in the ideological narratives and recruitment strategies of 
local jihadi groups. At the heart of this analysis is the question to what extent Indonesians 
and Malaysians were lured into joining ISIS as a result of its ‘universal’ ideology and global 
recruitment strategy or whether they were instead propelled by local Indonesian and 
Malaysian dynamics into Syria and into ‘importing’ and ‘indigenising’ ISIS to advance their 
own agendas.  
Drawing upon interviews with Islamists, police and government officials in Indonesia 
and Malaysia as well as material from Islamic studies sessions, sermons, Islamist 
publications, and police depositions, this article argues that the potency and appeal of the 
extremist narrative of ISIS derives from how it animates and feeds off prevailing debates 
within Indonesia and Malaysia.
12
 These debates revolve around issues such as the nature of 
Muslim identity and what it means to be a ‘good Muslim’, the place of Islamic law in society, 
relations within the ummah as well as with non-Muslims, and Islamic eschatology. While 
there is clearly a transnational dimension, the motivations for Southeast Asians to sympathize 
with or join the Syrian jihad and their engagement with ISIS are ultimately the product of 
local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics rather than the ‘lure’ of ISIS per se. This article 
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 4 
thus contributes to the broader scholarly debate on how ‘global’ the global jihad actually is 
and the phenomenon of ‘glocalisation’.13 
Approaching this inquiry from a comparative perspective, this article starts with an 
analysis of the motivations of Indonesians and Malaysians for going to Syria and Iraq and for 
supporting ISIS, focusing on ideology, territory and legitimacy as well as the debates in local 
jihadi circles on the ISIS Caliphate and the ‘End of Times’. It also examines the role played 
by the Indonesian and Malaysian states, looking at how the Malaysian state has inadvertently 
reinforced the ideology of ISIS through its deeply politicized policies and policing of the 
practice of the Muslim faith, and the absence of the state in Indonesian Islamist debates on 
the nature of Muslim identity and what constitutes heresy, which created the space for the 
ideology of ISIS to flourish. This article then proceeds to explore Indonesian and Malaysian 
pathways of radicalisation and recruitment, followed by a discussion of the hijrah process 
through which Indonesian and Malaysian extremists landed in Syria and Iraq to fight for 
ISIS. Here Indonesia’s network-driven radicalisation and recruitment followed by an 
organised hijrah is contrasted with Malaysia’s mostly online-driven radicalisation and 
recruitment, symptomatic of a more personalised hijrah. In its final section this article looks 
at how and why Indonesian jihadis have sought to draw ISIS into Indonesia while Malaysians 
jihadis have not. 
 
The Call to (the Islamic State’s) Jihad: Territory, Ideology, Legitimacy 
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 5 
The eruption of the civil war in Syria in 2011 and its evolution into a jihad attracted 
considerable attention in Southeast Asia as did the rise of ISIS in 2013 and the establishment 
of the Islamic State in June 2014. For Southeast Asians, like for many other foreign fighters, 
the territory ISIS conquered and the pace at which its forces swept through major cities like 
Raqqa and Mosul became one of the key reasons for supporting this new jihadi organisation. 
The rapid territorial expansion was seen not only as a military success and as evidence of the 
right strategy, but also as ‘divine favour.’14 The territoriality of ISIS compared favourably to 
the lack of territoriality of Al-Qaeda and with it Al-Qaeda associated groups in Syria such as 
Jabhat an-Nusra, and in that respect, ISIS was seen to have succeeded where Al-Qaeda failed. 
It also appealed at a more personal level to those who simply wanted to join the jihad, for 
whom it ‘made sense going for the strongest group’, and to those who were interested in 
living in a ‘true’ Islamic state, the ‘true’ Caliphate.15 Thus it is not surprising that recruitment 
of Southeast Asians into ISIS accelerated in 2014 and 2015, even to the point of inducing 
some who had initially joined other groups, such as Ajnad ash-Sham, to change affiliation.  
Territory alone, however, does not explain the appeal of ISIS but must be seen in 
conjunction with how its ideology interplayed with local Southeast Asian dynamics. It is this 
interplay which explains why Southeast Asian interest in the Syrian conflict has endured. 
Indeed local factors largely determined who departed for Syria and who did not. Only a small 
number of Filipino Muslims went to Syria as they were still actively involved in jihad at 
home in the southern Philippines. This did not, however, stop them from seeking the benefits 
of association with the Islamic State in their videos. Conversely, Indonesians and Malaysians 
went to Syria in larger numbers, in part because of their prevailing understanding that the 
conditions for bringing about an Islamic state in their own countries were not right.  
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The Syria conflict converged with local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics on at 
least three counts. The first concerned the ‘End of Times’ eschatology propounded by ISIS. 
Unlike most of the other jihadi organisations in Syria whose raison d’être was the struggle 
against the regime of Bashar al-Asad, ISIS not only sought to establish a ‘true’ Islamic state 
but also cast itself in the role of bringing about the apocalyptic ‘End of Times.’16 Within ISIS 
circles in Syria, a narrative emerged that referenced a hadith where the Prophet was believed 
to have said that the ‘Last Hour’ would see the Romans [the West] land at the Syrian town of 
Dabiq and that ‘an army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth’ [the 
mujahidin] would fight them.
17
 The Syria conflict was seen as indicating that the countdown 
to the ‘Last Hour’ had begun.18  
This narrative resonated in Indonesian Islamist circles because it tapped into 
considerable pre-existing interest in the apocalypse, which had been triggered by the increase 
in natural disasters in Indonesia as well as a solar and lunar eclipse during Ramadhan.  
Indeed, in 2005 former JI amir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir together with some activists from the 
Majles Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) even formed a committee to welcome the Mahdi 
(saviour).
19
 This pre-existing interest in Indonesia validated ISIS’s narrative and prompted 
Indonesians to travel to Syria in order to participate in this imminent ‘final battle’ between 
good and evil. 
   Such enthusiasm was also evident in jihadi circles in Malaysia.  According to 
Malaysian home ministry officials, several among the approximately 200 people detained for 
suspected ISIS sympathies had expressed that their interest in ISIS was piqued by a desire to 
be part of the apocalyptic battle which they had read about online in ISIS media, and to ‘leave 
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 7 
the struggles of this life in order to enjoy the fruits of heaven.’20  For instance, two Malaysian 
detainees admitted that they left for Syria in order to heed the call to fight the cataclysmic 
battle unfolding in Syria against the Shi’a, Christians, Jews, and other deviant sects.21  
Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi, a prominent Malaysian jihadi who was based in Syria 
until his death in 2017, expressed in an interview that: ‘I will not turn away from my duty to 
fight for the establishment of the Islamic State's Caliph leadership in preparing for the al-
Mahdi’s rule. . . . The Islamic State (IS) is the movement which is making preparations for al-
Mahdi’s rule towards the end of the world.’22  Others have suggested, however, that while 
some were drawn to the eschatology of ISIS, it may not have been the most significant 
factor.
23
  
At a second level, the Syrian conflict resonated with local identity politics. In 
Indonesia, these were expressed in ongoing debates among Indonesian Sunni Muslim 
organisations to redefine what it meant to be Muslim in Indonesia. In the context of these 
debates, attention fell on what was or was not deemed ‘Islamic’ as defined by these Muslim 
organisations.  Fault-lines were created, which led to the ostracising and targeting of those 
deemed heretics – liberal Muslims, Ahmadis, and Shi’as – by means of fatwa and physical 
intimidation.
24
 The Shi’as, were seen as particularly threatening as it was believed they had 
state-backing from Iran. Indonesian Sunni-Shi’a dynamics are exemplified by the tensions in 
Sampang, Madura, which predated the Syria conflict.  In 2006, Sunni ulama from Sampang 
tried to convert local Shi’as. In 2009, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in Sampang 
together with the police moved toward restricting Shi’a dakwah activities. In 2011, Shi’a 
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leader Tajik Muluk was asked to leave the area. After he failed to do so, his pesantren Darul 
Huda was burnt to the ground in November.
25
 In August 2012, Sunnis attacked Shi’as in 
Sampang, killing two and wounding dozens.
26
 While attacks on Indonesian Shi’as were 
localised, the anti-Shi’a sentiments were shared more broadly. By 2015 many Indonesian 
Islamists believed that the Shi’as had a plan to take over Indonesia between 2018 and 2020 
and this was widely speculated on in the Islamist media.
27
 This local Indonesian dynamic 
made the profoundly sectarian conflict in Syria directly relevant. The behaviour of the Asad 
regime as well as the entry of Hizballah and Iran on Asad’s side stoked Indonesian anti-Shi’a 
feelings further and provided additional proof of the perceived heretical nature of Shi’ism. 
The desire to fight Asad’s Shi’a coalition drew Indonesians to Syria not just on the 
side of ISIS but also on the side of local or al-Qaeda affiliated groups. ISIS’s extreme anti-
Shi’a narrative  also made it easy to be ‘imported’  and ‘indigenised’. In 2015 Indonesian 
ISIS member Bahrun Naim, who was based in Syria, ordered one of his men to attack a Shi’a 
mosque in Bogor. 
28
 In late 2015, another pro-ISIS group led by Abu Husna reportedly 
planned operations against Shi’a leaders and institutions.29   In November 2016, when 
Jakarta-based pro-ISIS Islamists headed by Abu Nusaibah were arrested in the context of the 
demonstration against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), Abu Nusaibah told 
the police that his group’s aim was ‘to prepare for the defense against the Shi’a who are 
planning to take over Indonesia in 2018’ and ‘to prepare for sending weapons from the 
Islamic State to Indonesia.’30 These competing narratives on who is a true believer were also 
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evident in Malaysia, where similar efforts to redefine what it meant to be Muslim were taking 
place, albeit often in the context of the partisan rivalry between the incumbent UMNO regime 
and its detractors. Compared to Indonesia, however, the state was far more complicit in much 
of these efforts. For instance, Friday sermons sanctioned by Malaysia’s Islamic Development 
Department, Jabatan Agama Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM), routinely referred to non-
Muslim Malaysians as ‘enemies of Islam’ and Shi’a Muslims as deviants, as has Pertubuhan 
Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU), a vocal association of Islamic scholars formed by UMNO-
affiliated Salafi ulama. The current administration of Najib Tun Razak has permitted the 
perpetuation of a view that Islam is under threat by Christians, Jews, and Shi’as even as it has 
rejected more moderating narratives from liberal and pluralist quarters of the Muslim 
intelligentsia in the country. This has given rise to views – not entirely misplaced - that as a 
consequence of this, the emerging Islamist discourse in Malaysia ‘shares many similarities 
with the uncompromising views of ISIS.’31 At its extreme, the manner in which Islam has 
been politicized in Malaysia has led some to argue that ‘the anti-Shi’a rhetoric disseminated 
through official media channels … combined with sermons by some scholars’ has made 
joining the jihad in Syria acceptable.
32
 This view has been reinforced by the work of 
Mohamed Nawab and Aida Arosaie, whose interviews with some ustadz in Malaysian 
Islamic institutions uncovered views that endorsed jihad against Shi’a and Alawites as 
obligatory.
33
 
 The third level where the Syrian jihad fed into local Southeast Asian dynamics can be 
discerned from debates over the legitimacy of armed jihad as a means through which to 
introduce Islamic law and bring an Islamic state into being in the region. In Indonesia, the 
Syrian jihad resonated with the debate in militant circles about the legitimacy of jihad in 
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Indonesia, the effectiveness of local jihadi efforts, how to fulfil the obligation of jihad, and 
the scope of takfir (the practice in which Muslims excommunicate their co-religionists). This 
debate
 
pitted those who saw armed jihad in Indonesia as counter-productive against those 
who considered it the only way to achieve an Islamic state.
34
 It juxtaposed those who thought 
the time for jihad was not yet right against those who thought it was, and resulted in 
disagreement over whether Muslims working for the Indonesian state were guilty of 
‘apostasy by association.’35 The Syrian jihad had the effect of a general revival of jihadi 
fervour in Indonesia.
36
 However, it also reinforced pre-existing divisions among Indonesian 
jihadis, especially after ISIS started attacking Jabhat an-Nusra in Syria in late 2013. 
Indonesians who saw jihad as legitimate in Indonesia and as the only way to achieve an 
Islamic state now openly supported ISIS.   
Not unlike what unfolded in Indonesia, the local socio-political milieu in Malaysia, 
where religion is frequently mobilized in service of narrow political interests, amplified the 
appeal of ISIS by placing the matter of the necessity of the implementation of Islamic 
strictures at the forefront of national discourse, irrespective of the fact that 40 percent of the 
population are non-Muslims. Malaysia’s dominant political party, UMNO, as a Malay-
Muslim party that is predicated on the principle of Malay-Muslim supremacy, advanced a 
narrative that this supremacy was under siege from various (non-Malay) cultural and (non-
Muslim) religious quarters and hence had to be defended. Given that Malaysia has a Malay-
Muslim majority population, UMNO’s chief political opponents are also Malay-Muslim 
parties who brandish religious credentials as a source of legitimacy. To the extent that there is 
political ideology at play in Malaysia, it is Islam, and specifically, a particularly exclusive 
brand of Islamism which has no intention to encourage pluralism or compromise. The effect 
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of this is that Malaysian politics became characterised by parties trying to ‘out-Islam’ each 
other, as evident from the drive to implement hudud, the move to ban the use of the term ‘hot 
dog’, or to legally proscribe the use of the term ‘Allah’ by non-Muslims for fear of the 
‘confusion’ this might cause to Muslims.37 Moreover, the fact that it became heavily 
politicized meant that religion came to be viewed as a zero sum game simply because politics 
was a zero sum game.  
A longstanding expression of this Islamization process has been the mounting 
pressure for the implementation of syariah law in Malaysia. This move has found advocates 
in both UMNO and PAS, and across the civil society terrain as well. Perhaps the most 
striking evidence of this is UMNO’s response to recent moves by PAS to table a Private 
Member’s Bill calling for the introduction of hudud and expansion of the syariah court’s 
sentencing powers, which has been met by either silence or tacit support on the part of the 
UMNO leadership. It has also found expression in the increasing frequency with which 
Malaysian leaders at the highest levels have come to declare Malaysia an Islamic State. This 
began in September 2001 when then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad famously declared 
that Malaysia was already an Islamic state. This view was reiterated by Najib Razak when he 
was Deputy Prime Minister in 2007, and again in October 2017 by the Deputy Minister in the 
Prime Minister’s Department (in charge of religious affairs), Asyaf Wajdi Dusuki.38 Yet 
perhaps the most bizarre example of how this quest for political legitimacy found expression 
in language easily construed to be sympathetic to ISIS was the statement made by Malaysian 
prime minister and UMNO party president Najib Razak during the course of a party event in 
Cheras in 2013, when he chose to set ISIS – which at that time was still a relatively unknown 
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entity - as an exemplar for the Malay-Muslim political struggle and exhorts his cadre to 
follow the ISIS example: 
When someone dares to fight to the death, they can defeat a bigger opponent. 
Consider how ISIS (ISIL), with only a strength of 1300, defeated the 30,000 strong 
Iraqi army, to the extent that four or five three-star generals were forced to run to 
safety by jumping out the window in the middle of the night. Why? Because they are 
afraid of those who are brave.
39
 
 
Attempts to move the national discourse away from an overly exclusivist register ran 
up against the political interests of the state and power of the state to define and police the 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ Islam. This resulted, on the one hand, in Malaysia’s religious authorities 
denouncing ISIS as a Wahhabi and salafi entity whose engagement in violence is haram, but 
at the same time, not explicitly repudiating its takfiri and anti-Shi’a ideology or invalidating 
the notion of the need to revive the Caliphate.
40
 This religio-political climate in Malaysia 
created fertile ground for the extremist ideas of ISIS, including within the Malaysian security 
forces and state religious organisations. Indeed, a religious official from the department of 
religion in Malacca is known to have gone to join the Syrian jihad.
41
  
In addition to the areas where Syrian and local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics 
intersected, Southeast Asians were also ‘attracted by the more simply defined notion that this 
is a Just War in which Muslims have to defend their co-religionists against repression and 
mortal threat.’42 This was particularly evident among ISIS sympathisers in Malaysia, where 
anger against the atrocities perpetrated by the Shi’a- backed Alawite Asad regime against 
Sunni Muslim civilians served as a major motivation to join the conflict alongside repentance 
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for living a life of vice, and political motivations predicated on perceived parallels between 
the failed government in Syria and the failure of government in Malaysia. In one instance, a 
Malaysian ISIS supporter shared that he had initially been haunted by guilt and suicidal 
thoughts for a life of sin, but then became convinced that he could atone for that by waging a 
jihad in Syria and dying in the process instead.
43
 
It is important to point out that the preceding discussion on the intersection of Syrian 
and local Indonesian and Malaysian dynamics is not to suggest an immediate correlation 
between these dynamics and recruitment into ISIS per se, but rather to highlight the existence 
of conditions and climates that lend themselves quite easily to the extremist and intolerant 
narratives propounded by ISIS. Indeed, to consider how these conditions give rise to active 
support for and participation in the ISIS jihad, whether in Syria or locally, attention must now 
turn to the matter of recruitment. 
 
Radicalisation and Recruitment: offline vs. online  
Based on current estimates obtained from the respective authorities, approximately 
700-800 Indonesians and 80-100 Malaysians departed for Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 
2017.
44
 In addition, several hundred ISIS sympathizers have been arrested in each country. 
While these figures pale in comparison to recruitment trends in Europe and North Africa, 
they are not inconsequential, especially when considering the potential threat posed by 
hardened returnees. For this reason, an informed appreciation for recruitment and 
radicalisation trends in Southeast Asia is imperative.   
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What marks Indonesia out in comparison to Malaysia but also with Europe, the US 
and Australia,
45
 is the degree to which radicalisation and recruitment was organised and 
occurred largely within pre-existing jihadi circles and networks. This does not mean that the 
internet and social media did not play a role at all. Indonesian Islamist websites such as the 
pro-ISIS site al-Mustaqbal and the pro-Jabhat an-Nusra site Arrahmah contributed to the 
radicalisation of Indonesian Muslims through their graphic reports, photographs and videos 
on the Syria conflict. However, they played little if any role in actual recruitment. For this, 
organised radicalisation efforts through lectures, sermons, pengajian (Islamic study sessions 
in small groups), or seminars proved far more effective. Social media such as Facebook and 
Telegram were sometimes used to make initial contacts, but the subsequent assessment, 
which was the first step in the recruitment process, was face-to-face for the majority of 
Indonesian ISIS recruits.  The reason why radicalisation and recruitment in Indonesia could 
be conducted in this manner was the result of the different approaches of the state to defining 
Islam as suggested previously, but also towards Muslim mobilisation. The Indonesian state’s 
laissez faire approach allowed for a broad range of Muslim social organizations, including 
those with salafi and/or jihadi ideologies, to organise and to shape this debate. This created 
the space for face-to-face recruitment through organisations belonging to the local pro-ISIS 
network. 
Exemplary of the organisational space open to ISIS sympathisers in Indonesia is the 
public declaration of support for ISIS in March 2014 at the Hotel Indonesia roundabout, on 
one of the busiest and most central roads in Jakarta. This declaration was organised by 
Muhammad Fachry, Bahrumsyah, and Syamsudin Uba. Fachry was the editor of al-
Mustaqbal and leader of the Islamic Sharia Activists Forum (FAKSI). Bahrumsyah, who 
would later go to Syria and become the commander of the ISIS Indonesian-Malaysian 
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battalion, was also active in FAKSI and knew Uba through the Committee for Solidarity with 
the Islamic World (KISDI). According to Uba, this public declaration aimed at showing 
‘support for both syariah in Indonesia and support for ISIS in Syria and Iraq’. He further 
explained that the public bai’at (oath-taking) ceremonies following the declaration of the 
Caliphate on 29 June 2014 - which became another form of organised radicalisation and 
indeed, organised induction - had a similar dual, global and local purpose.
46
  
Some 2,000 Indonesians pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State in 
July and August 2014,
47
 reflecting the enthusiasm with which the announcement of the 
Caliphate was met. Indeed, Uba suggested that there were so many mass bai’at ceremonies to 
meet public demand: 
The public bai’at were carried out because so many people asked us. The first public 
bai’at was at UIN [State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta]. It was led by 
Ustadz Anwar, one of Bahrumsyah’s men. The auditorium was so full that people 
stood outside. The women were in the balcony and the men downstairs.
48
  
Lower profile and less public bai’at continued to take place throughout 2015, 2016 and 2017 
at seminars and pengajian. According to Uba,  
What happened was that we would hold a seminar or a pengajian and the people 
would ask us to lead them in the bai’at. Ustadz Fauzan [Anshori] was asked almost at 
every public event to lead the people in the bai’at and there are still public bai’at until 
today. They take place at pengajian.
49
 
Pro-ISIS seminars such as those held by Syamsudin Uba in 2015 and 2016 focused on the 
‘glorious economy’ and the justice of the Caliphate, on the obligation and benefits of hijrah, 
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on how the ‘Caliphate will rule the world and end colonialism’;50 on the failure of the forces 
fighting against the Islamic State’51 – both western and Shi’a; or on the identity and lineage 
of Caliph Ibrahim.
52
 Uba lectured mainly in Bekasi, Jakarta’s poorer, more crowded and 
more religious urban neighbour, where his message of ‘economic prosperity and justice’ 
resonated greatly. In pro-ISIS pengajian across Indonesia participants were introduced to the 
now standardised ‘ISIS curriculum’ which comprises the ‘Tauhid material series’ by Aman 
Abdurrahman,
53
 or Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab’s ‘Book of Tauhid’ as well as Wahab’s 
‘Ten Nullifiers of Islam,’54 alongside discussions on the ‘End of Time’, the Caliphate, 
martyrdom, escaping the torments of the grave, the 72 virgins, and intercession for the 
family. It was at these lectures, sermons, seminars, and above all the more intimate setting of 
the pengajian, rather than online through social media, that individuals were identified by 
recruiters for face-to-face discussions designed to elicit a commitment to the cause of the 
Syrian jihad.
55
 
As most of the debate on Syria and ISIS took place within existing Indonesian 
Islamist networks and jihadi circles, the line between recruitment and poaching was often 
blurred. ISIS supporters seized the opportunity to tap into the fragile, splintering Indonesian 
jihadi community. This included specifically targeting key, high profile personalities from 
other organisations in the hope that they would legitimise the emerging Indonesian pro-ISIS 
network and that their joining would trigger an exodus of their followers as well. The most 
obvious case in this respect was that of ageing cleric, Abu Bakr Ba’asyir.  As one of the 
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founders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993, Ba’asyir had great symbolic value. He was held in 
high esteem among many within Indonesian Islamist circles and even in parts of the more 
mainstream Muslim community who considered him to be a victim of an American led 
proscription of Muslims with anti-Western views. He was also far more charismatic than the 
leader of the pro-ISIS network in Indonesia, Aman Abdurrahman. As amir of Jemaah 
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an organisation Ba’asyir established in 2008 in order to conduct 
dakwah jahriyah (open proselytization), he was also seen as being able to bring JAT into the 
pro-ISIS fold.
 56
 
Ironically, the recruitment of Ba’asyir took place in the Nusakambangan maximum 
security prison complex to which Ba’asyir had been sent in 2011 after he was sentenced to 15 
years for supporting terrorism following the discovery of a jihadi training camp in Aceh in 
2010. In prison, Ba’asyir was targeted by Indonesian ISIS supporters imprisoned within the 
same complex, who managed to convince him to abandon his position of neutrality towards 
the various jihadi groups in Syria and to throw his support behind ISIS.
57
 As JAT spokesman 
Ahmad Fatih explained: 
He was influenced by Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab who are in Pasir Putih 
prison with him in Nusakambangan. I think Ustadz Abu [Bakr Ba’asyir] was 
  swayed because he supported the establishment of syariah and an Islamic 
  state for such a long time and when ISIS declared the khilafa all he saw was  
that it had syariah and was an Islamic state. He also believed that a lot of  
ulama supported this. He showed us a list. This list had one who was  
listed five times with different names. It was totally inflated. A lot of the  
information he received was simply not correct. What worried us most was  
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that he was so influenced that he didn’t even believe his own sons.58 
Following ISIS leader al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the Caliphate, Ba’asyir pledged 
allegiance from his prison cell.
59
 He then told JAT members that ‘al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate 
was the true khilafa and that it was an obligation to take the bai’at and if you didn’t you were 
no longer JAT.’60  Ba’asyir further ordered JAT members to go to Syria and join ISIS, 
causing JAT to split between those who supported the Caliphate and those who opposed it. 
The latter, who comprised about 80 percent of JAT, formed a new organisation, Jemaah 
Ansharut Syariah (JAS).
 61
   
Ba’asyir was not the only high profile personality targeted. Former military 
commander of Mujahidin Kompak, Abdullah Sunata, was also successfully recruited by ISIS 
while in prison. His recruitment, too, was seen as a door to the rest of the organisation. In 
fact, members of Mujahidin Kompak were highly sought after for their previous jihadi 
experience in Ambon and Poso, and also because their membership included trainers who 
could impart shooting and bomb-making skills to potential recruits. Moreover, the fact that 
their organisation had effectively folded after the Aceh training camp debacle in 2010, 
leaving them ‘homeless,’ meant that the opportunity availed to provide them a new cause. 
Finally, the alumni of Mujahidin Kompak also had one of theirs – Abu Walid (discussed 
later) - in the ISIS leadership in Syria. 
 Less successful was the approach to Ustadz Abu Rusdan, a one time member of the JI 
central leadership, who also commanded widespread respect in Islamist circles. As Abu 
Rusdan himself explained: 
There were some ISISers that came to me and asked me to join them. I said to 
them that before I answer I would like you to answer five questions. Until now 
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I have not received an answer from them. My five questions were: First, who 
decided that al-Baghdadi should be the Caliph? Second, who has proven his 
lineage? … Third, what is the reason that al-Baghdadi broke with Zawaheri, 
al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada? Fourth, what is the proof that this khilafa is based 
on the prophetic methodology? And fifth, the takfir issue. I have not received 
any answers because they don’t have any answers. And that is why I don’t 
support ISIS.
62
 
Lastly, ISIS supporters were not above poaching members from each other within the 
pro-ISIS network. This is certainly what Abu Nusaibah stands accused of having done by 
followers of Syamsudin Uba who described him as a bandal (rascal).
63
 
In the case of ISIS recruitment in Malaysia, there have been several discernible 
patterns. First, unlike Indonesia, most Malaysians were radicalised and recruited over social 
media and in cyberspace, where such platforms were the predominant factor in generating 
sympathy and support for the ISIS cause. This was largely due to the fact that the Malaysian 
government tightly controlled public activities and space, restricting Islamist organisations 
through a number of legal and security tools. In addition, effective counterterrorism policies 
reinforced by strong security legislation have made it more difficult for terrorist groups to 
form and mobilise in Malaysia.
64
 This ‘pushed’ Malaysian ISIS supporters down the internet 
recruitment route in order to bypass scrutiny from the security establishment. Notably, in 
several instances Malaysian recruits had proactively sought out terrorist groups online after 
they were radicalised from their own exposure to extremist material over the internet,
65
 some 
of these communicating directly with Muhammad Wanndy. Having said that, security 
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officials have also admitted more recently that they have detected the existence of several 
small ISIS cells comprising self-radicalised extremists who nevertheless managed to gather. 
As one official expressed: ‘This is what we fear. If it was lone wolves in the past, they have 
now become packs of wolves which have no links to other groups.’66 
The effectiveness of social media platforms for terrorist recruitment was described by 
the principal assistant director of the Royal Malaysian Police Counter Terrorism Division, 
Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay in the following manner:  
[In the past], most of them were recruited through special religious classes that you'd 
have to attend physically. But now, maybe you go to Facebook or surf the Internet for 
one hour, and then you are influenced by this ideology - you want to go to Syria to 
fight with the Islamic State. So that's why we have a big problem.
67
 
Indicative of this concerted effort to radicalise and recruit Malaysians (and Indonesians) 
through the internet, Malaysian authorities have claimed that there were up to seven Malay-
language websites and blogs established by ISIS and their supporters that extol the heroics of 
Malaysian and Indonesian fighters.
68
 According to the Malaysian home minister, Ahmad 
Zahid Hamidi, 75% of the 107 ISIS sympathizers in detention in early 2017 had admitted that 
they were drawn to the ISIS cause via social media, and the majority of them were first time 
offenders.
69
 Most of them were young, with a few explaining that they admired the heroics of 
the young, male ISIS fighters they encountered over the internet and later started to identify 
with them as they learned more about their lives online.
70
 Although there have only been a 
handful of Malaysians who have returned from Syria, they are known to have played an 
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instrumental recruitment role by way of sharing of stories and experience garnered from the 
Syrian jihad.
71
  
Second, the number of women who have been recruited has been surprisingly high. 
While many are wives of militants who took their entire families to Syria, there have also 
been a significant number of single females who have proactively sought to marry ISIS 
fighters. In one instance, Malaysian police apprehended a 14 year old girl who was on the 
verge of departing for Cairo in order to marry a 22 year old Malaysian ISIS sympathizer who 
she met on Facebook, after which both were planning to depart for Syria via Istanbul. In 
another case, a 28 year old girl left Kuala Lumpur for Syria September 2014 after lengthy 
communications with ISIS fighters in Syria over her smartphone.
72
 A tumblr blog, which has 
since been taken down, documented how a Malaysian who went by the moniker Bird of 
Jannah – she was purportedly a medical doctor - had answered a call to help in an ISIS-run 
hospital in Syria but who also claimed to have left home to be married ‘in the land of Jihad 
until martyrdom do [us] part.’73 Indeed, Malaysian recruits to ISIS gained further notoriety 
because of suggestions that ‘lonely (Malaysian) widows’ were particularly targeted and that 
some may have gone to become ‘jihadi brides.’   
While Malaysian women have previously also been involved in militant activities, it 
has mostly been as supporters confined to home soil rather than venturing to foreign conflict 
zones to partake in jihad, let alone to get married there. In this respect, the emergence of 
single females ready and willing to depart for Syria for the dual purpose of waging jihad and 
wedlock speaks to a new phenomenon in Malaysia, one that does not appear to have featured 
in Indonesia. 
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Third, a careful consideration of recruitment and indoctrination processes in Malaysia 
throws up several key Malaysian individuals. Lotfi Ariffin, who was injured in an airstrike 
and subsequently died in a Turkish hospital in September 2014, played an instrumental role 
soon after the Syrian crisis broke out by creating awareness of the conflict in Malaysian 
social media circles. His departure to Syria for jihad was highly publicised and served to 
inspire others.
74
 A second Malaysian personality of consequence was Muhammad Wanndy 
Muhammad Jedi from Durian Tunggal, Malacca, who went to Syria in January 2015.
75
 Here 
social media connected the self-confessed ‘loner’, according to his own Facebook posting, 
with ISIS which played upon his need for recognition.’ Until his death, Muhammad Wanndy 
was known to have played an important role in recruiting Malaysian jihadis via his popular 
Facebook page, where he was known as Abu Hamzah al-Fateh. And finally, Mahmud Ahmad 
alias Abu Handzalah, who was apprehended by Malaysian police in July 2014. Mahmud 
Ahmad was a university lecturer in the field of Islamic Thought, who was suspected to be a 
key ISIS recruiter based in Malaysia and allegedly the leader of the Malaysia-based ‘ISIS 
Black Flag’ cell.76 An introvert by nature according to his colleagues, Mahmud Ahmad was 
believed to have recruited Mohd Najib Hussein alias Abu Anas, who became a bomb-maker 
and ISIS sympathizer with links to the Philippines-based militant group, Abu Sayyaf. Abu 
Anas was killed in Basilan, southern Philippines during a clash with Philippine military 
forces in December 2015. Mahmud would later figure prominently in ISIS-related violence in 
the region, playing a leading role in orchestrating the siege in Marawi City in May 2017 until 
his reported death in October as the Philippine military retook the city centre (at the time of 
writing his remains had not been recovered). 
 
Hijrah and joining ISIS in Syria 
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Similar to recruitment, the hijrah of Indonesians to Syria was an organised process, 
albeit complex as the pro-ISIS network was diffused and riddled by rivalries. The first 
Indonesians who made their own way to Syria to join the jihad were mostly students already 
living abroad. They included Riza Fardi who left his studies in Yemen in 2012 to join Suqour 
al-Izz,
77
 Wildan Mukhollad who left his studies at Al-Azhar in Egypt late 2012 to join 
Katibah al-Muhajirin,
78
 Yazid Ulwan Falahuddin and Wijangga Bagus Panulat who left their 
technical studies in Turkey to join ISIS in 2013,
79
 and four Indonesian students studying at 
the International Islamic University in Islamabad: Dawin Nuha Abdullah, Muhammad Fakhri 
Insani, Rusydan Abdul Hadi, and Arisdiantoto.
80
 Subsequently, jihadis departing from 
Indonesia generally went through ‘organised’ channels linked to existing jihadi networks 
with prospective fighters covering their own travel expenses.
81
 According to one ISIS 
recruiter, there are ‘three steps a candidate has to go through: first, iman (belief), second, 
hijrah, and third, jihad. Of these ‘iman is the only level to be accomplished in Indonesia. 
After that you have to join the system.’82 Iman is imparted through the pengajian and 
candidates are evaluated on their proficiency in reading the Quran, fasting on Mondays and 
Thursdays, and their behaviour more generally.
 83
 They then undergo an evaluation by a 
panitia lokal (local committee) or panitia hijrah (hijrah committee), separate to the 
pengajian. The committees or panels could be attached to any of the groups associated with 
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the pro-ISIS network. They were ad hoc in nature, based on loose selection criteria, and if the 
applicant was successful he was given a tazkiyah (letter of recommendation).
84
  
For those who already had ‘jihadi credentials’ going to Syria was an easier and faster 
process. Such credentials included previous jihadi experience, affiliation with a jihadi group, 
or coming from a ‘jihadi family.’ The latter explains the phenomenon of ‘generational 
regeneration,’ where the sons of those who had fought in the Afghan jihad now joined the 
Syrian jihad. The most prominent of these were Omar Abdul Aziz, son of Bali bomber Imam 
Samudra,
85
 and Rusydan Abdul Hadi, son of JI Afghanistan veteran Amir Mahmud
86
 who 
both joined ISIS, as well as Ridwan Abdul Hayyi, son of MMI deputy amir Abu Jibriel,
87
 
who joined a local Syrian group.
88
   
Many Indonesians, especially those travelling with families, went as part of a larger 
group. These groups were facilitated by ISIS sympathisers whose role was akin to that of a 
travel agent. One of these was Helmi Alamudi who started facilitating groups of Indonesians 
going to Syria in June-July 2014 until his arrest in March 2015. In his deposition, Alamudi 
stated that he took on this role after returning from Syria himself in April 2014. He was 
motivated by the fact that he knew the route but also by the belief that he could arrange a 
cheaper deal. He purchased plane tickets from Indonesia to Turkey for prospective recruits, 
favouring the route from Juanda Airport (Surabaya) to Malaysia or Hongkong, then Turkey. 
Only the fourth group that he facilitated departed from Soekarno-Hatta Airport. This group 
stayed in temporary accommodation at Pondok Al-Mukmin in Malang before departing for 
Jakarta by train. Alamudi also gave them instructions how to proceed from Istanbul to 
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Gaziantep by bus or plane.
89
 In total, he organised the hijrah of 39 people.
90
 By August 2015, 
some 19 women and 43 Indonesian children had successfully made the journey to Syria. 
Another 15 women and 20 children had been intercepted and deported from Turkey.
91
 In 
January 2016, Sidney Jones estimated that the total number of Indonesians in Syria stood at 
‘just over 400 nationals,’ 45 per cent of which ‘were women and children, and not all the 
adult males were fighters.’92 Most of these Indonesians joined ISIS but it is also estimated 
that between 20 and 40 Indonesians have been involved with Jabhat an-Nusra both as fighters 
and humanitarian aid workers.
93
 In 2017, this number had reached 700-800 and despite the 
military operations against ISIS in Raqqa, Indonesians were still trying to go to Syria.
94
 
The first Malaysians who went to Syria as early as 2012 did not join ISIS but Jabhat 
an-Nusra or Ajnad ash-Sham. The link with An-Nusra was established through former JI 
leader Yazid Sufaat, who recruited through ceramah (Islamic discussions, similar to 
pengajian in Indonesia) at his house. He eventually established four cells to support pro-al-
Qaeda forces in Syria.
95
 Many of those who joined Ajnad ash-Sham, which is linked to the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, were formerly members of KMM (Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia) and often were also supporters of PAS. The key role in this first batch of 
Malaysian recruits was played by the aforementioned Lotfi Ariffin. Ariffin, himself a former 
member of PAS, had departed for Syria via Turkey in February 2014 to join Ajnad ash-
Sham,
96
 where he was involved in operations against ISIS.  
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Although Turkey had been the gateway into Syria for Malaysians, because of close 
monitoring by Malaysian security officials of departures from Kuala Lumpur to Turkey and 
Middle Eastern destinations, potential Malaysian recruits have had to seek out alternative 
transit points such as Bangkok.
97
 It should also be noted that not all who departed for Syria in 
these early years went for the purpose of taking up arms; some had departed for Syria in 
order to join humanitarian relief organisations but upon arrival were dragooned into joining 
militant groups.
98
 
While the first batch of Malaysians flocked to the competition, the second batch, was 
mostly ISIS in membership and orientation, not least because ISIS had established an 
Indonesian-Malay archipelago battalion - Katibah Nusantara lid Daulah Islamiyya. Katibah 
Nusantara, was formed in September 2014 under the command of Bahrumsyah alias Abu 
Muhammad al-Indunisy, an Indonesian jihadi who had left for Syria in May 2014 and 
appeared in the ISIS video ‘Join the Ranks’ two months later.99 Bahrumsyah, originally from 
Bogor, briefly studied at the Syarief Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Ciputat before 
dropping out in 2004 after only three semesters. He became a follower of the radical cleric 
Aman Abdurrahman whose religious lectures he organised in the Pamulang area.
100
 As 
mentioned earlier, Bahrumsyah was one of the organisers of the pro-ISIS rally in Jakarta in 
March 2014 alongside Syamsudin Uba and Muhammad Fachry.  
Originally based in ash-Shaddadi, al-Hasakah province, Syria, Katibah Nusantara was 
believed to have had around 100 fighters when it was formed.
101
 It was divided into 
‘departments’ for combat fighters, snipers, heavy weapons, tactics and strategy, and military 
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management,
102
 and aimed to provide Southeast Asian volunteers with military, Arabic and 
ideological training before they joined the main ISIS fighting force as well as assist families 
of fighters to settle down in the ‘Islamic State.’  When Ash-Shaddadi came under attack by 
Kurdish forces, Katibah Nusantara moved to the area around Raqqa. And as Syrian military 
operations to liberate Raqqa from ISIS commenced in 2017, Katibah Nusantara moved to the 
area of Deir Ezzor. Indonesian and Malaysian fighters from Katibah Nusantara played 
significant roles in several military engagements including at Mount Sinjar in March 2015 
and Tel Tamr in April 2015 where they spearheaded attacks on Kurdish positions in 
operations where they incurred heavy losses.
103
 Battlefield casualties alone, however, were 
not the only challenge. Katibah Nusantara also witnessed a leadership struggle between 
Bahrumsyah and fellow Indonesian Salim Mubarok Attamimi alias Abu Jandal al-Yemeni al-
Indonesi, which in turn led to further strains. Abu Jandal, who originated from Pasuruan, is 
believed to have had prior jihadi experience with AQAP in Yemen.
104
 He also had his own 
network in several regencies in East Java from which he recruited. Abu Jandal departed for 
Syria in May 2014 with his wife and five children. In December 2014 he appeared in a 
Youtube video threatening Indonesia’s military commander and head of police.105 Abu Jandal 
was critical of Bahrumsyah’s authoritarian style as well as his failure to distribute funds 
meant for Katibah members.
106
 Unable to resolve these issues with Bahrumsyah, Abu Jandal 
and his supporters moved to Homs and established a new Katibah – Katibah Masyaariq. He 
was subsequently killed in Mosul in November 2016 and the leadership of his Katibah first 
passed to Hery Kusdianto, who was killed in 2017, and then to an ustadz from Lampung 
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In addition to Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal, two other Indonesians featured 
prominently in ISIS in Syria, although their exact roles in relation to the structure of ISIS 
remain unclear. The first is Bahrun Naim, a former member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
originally from Pekalongan. Naim was sentenced in 2011 to two and half years prison for the 
illegal possession of weapons and ammunition. In early 2015 he departed for Syria where he 
initially linked up with Katibah Nusantara. Unwilling to take sides when the battalion split, 
he left first for Raqqa and then Manbij, later returning to Raqqa when Kurdish forces moved 
against Manbij.
107
 Like Abu Jandal, Bahrun Naim had his own network, the so-called Team 
Hisbah in Solo. He also had links to Mujahidin East Indonesia (MIT), a Poso-based militant 
group which was the first in Indonesia to swear allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. Although Naim had links to both Aman Abdurrahman and the late MIT leader 
Santoso, his role seemed to have been to encourage, direct, and fund operations in Indonesia 
such as the planned attacks on a police station, a temple, and church on 17 August 2015 in 
Solo, the planned attacks on New Year’s Eve of 2015,108 and the planned attack on the 
presidential palace on 11 December 2016 by what would have been Indonesia’s first female 
suicide bomber, Dian Yulia Novi.
109
  Bahrun Naim was killed in November 2017. 
The second is Abu Walid al-Indunisy who appeared in the al-Furat video ‘Bersatulah 
Jangan Berpecah Belah’ (Be United, Not Divided) in April 2016 sitting on the banks of the 
Euphrates calling upon Indonesians to pledge their allegiance to the Caliph.
110
 Abu Walid is 
an experienced mujahid who went to Ambon with Mujahidin KOMPAK in 1999 where he 
fought under the name of Kholid. In 2003 he went to fight in the Philippines, where he was 
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known as Faiz, until his arrest in Zamboanga in December 2004. After his acquittal in 
December 2013 he briefly returned to Indonesia before departing for Syria.   
Malaysians started to join Katibah Nusantara in November 2014 when a group of 
them left Ajnad ash-Sham to join ISIS. This shift in allegiance was directly linked to loss of 
leadership with the death of Lotfi Ariffin in September 2014 as well as shifts within the 
broader anti-Asad coalition, most notably the decision of Ajnad ash-Sham to cooperate with 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Katibah Nusantara presented the opportunity to join other 
Malay speakers in pursuit of jihad in a foreign land. Intriguingly though, Malaysian fighters 
were initially reticent towards Katibah Nusantara, preferring to fight alongside foreign 
fighters in other groups rather than fighting under Indonesian command.
111
 At the same time 
there was a growing ideological alignment with ISIS as illustrated by the appearance of two 
Malaysians in an ISIS video featuring the beheading of an ‘Asad spy’ in February 2015. The 
two were later identified as Mohamed Faris Anuar from Kedah, who went to Syria in 
September 2014, and the aforementioned Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi.
112
 Until his 
death in Raqqa on 29 April 2017 Muhammad Wanndy had sought to be the top Malaysian 
ISIS operative in Syria.
113
  
A substantial proportion of the Malaysian contingent in Syria comprises women and 
children. As of August 2017, it was believed that 17 of the remaining 57 Malaysians still in 
Syria were children, with a significant number of the other 40 being women, specifically, 
widows of slain Malaysian ISIS fighters.
114
 Unlike the Indonesian case, where there was 
active vetting and recruitment being undertaken through local facilitators on the ground, most 
of the Malaysians who ventured to Syria undertook their journey to Turkey on their own and 
upon arrival were met by ISIS recruiters and smuggled into Syria. There were, of course, 
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some exceptions, such as those who were directly recruited and funded by Yazid Sufaat for 
Jabhat an-Nusra, or Mahmud Ahmad for ISIS. There is presently little indication that either 
fighters or widows and children are returning to Malaysia, despite the casualty count of 
Malaysians in Syria in the course of the battle for Raqqa and Homs. Indeed, some slain 
Malaysian fighters had in fact committed their children to the continuation of the jihad in 
Syria.
115
  
 
‘Importing’ and ‘Indigenising’ ISIS 
The intertwining of the global and local dimensions is not only key to understanding 
why Indonesians and Malaysians went to Syria to join ISIS but also for understanding why 
some of them sought to pull ISIS into Southeast Asia. Here, too, local dynamics are 
definitive, explaining why Indonesians have been more successful than Malaysians in 
importing and indigenising ISIS. Malaysia’s restrictions on militant Islamists using various 
legal tools and extensive security operations undertaken by the highly experienced Special 
Branch, have closed the space for pro-ISIS organisations or a pro-ISIS network to operate, 
although in 2017 there was some evidence that Malaysian ISIS sympathizers had begun to 
form small self-funded cells. As a result, pro-ISIS or ISIS-claimed terrorist activities, such as 
the attack on the Movida Restaurant and Bar in June 2016, were relegated to the realm of the 
‘lone wolves’ or ‘wolf packs’.  
In Indonesia, in comparison, the lack of restrictions and uneven implementation of 
legislation on social, political, and religious organisation allowed for ISIS to be grafted onto 
existing networks such as Tawhid wal Jihad, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) discussed 
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earlier, Mujahedin Indonesia Timur (MIT), and parts of the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).
116
 
At the heart of this network is Indonesian cleric Aman Abdurrahman, who was sentenced to 
15 years in prison on Nusakambangan island for his involvement in recruiting for and 
funding of the 2010 Aceh training camp. He was the leader of Tawhid wal Jihad, an 
amorphous group formed in 2004, which followed the salafi ideology espoused by the 
Palestinian-Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi whose writings Abdurrahman 
translated into Indonesian.  He has also been credited with ‘importing’ and ‘indigenizing’ the 
ideology of ISIS. Indeed, according to then Jakarta Police chief Tito Karnavian, ‘Tawhid wal 
Jihad is the core of ISIS Indonesia just like the Middle Eastern Tawhid wal Jihad is the core 
ISIS.’117 In an effort to give this loose Indonesian pro-ISIS network more structure, the 
umbrella organisation Ansharud Daulah Islamiyyah (ADI) was established in August 2015, 
which later evolved into Jemaah Ansharul Daulah (JAD).
118
 JAD is organised along 
territorial lines which in August 2017 had known wilayas (regions) in Greater Jakarta 
(Jabodetabek), Banten, Central Java, East Java, West Java, Lampung, and Kalimantan
119
 as 
well as a cell in Toli Toli (Sulawesi) and a self-affiliated cell in Medan (Sumatra).   
 The spread of the pro-ISIS groups was driven by competition within the broader 
Indonesian jihadi community whereby affiliation with ISIS was used to bolster  the jihadi 
credentials and agendas of some clerics and personalities. For instance Abu Husna, a former 
JI recruiter who left JI to join JAT, formed his own network of pro-ISIS groups Jamaah 
Ansharul Khilafa (JAK). . JAK includes Abu Nusaibah’s Jakarta-based group. It is also 
loosely affiliated with Syamsudin Uba’s organisation Al-Aqsa Al-Haqquna, which Uba sees 
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as ‘off structure’ as ‘one could only be part of the ISIS structure if one was based in Syria.’120 
Driven largely by personal animosity toward Aman Abdurrahman, JAK is neither JAD’s 
equal in numbers, nor in geographic spread or influence.  
 Another factor that facilitated the ‘import’ of ISIS into Indonesia was that, unlike 
Malaysia, it already had an active arena of local jihad. This jihad was conducted by 
Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah. MIT emerged from 
JAT’s Poso branch of which Santoso had been the military commander. It drew upon the 
grievances of the 1998-2007 Christian-Muslim communal conflict in Central Sulawesi. 
Indeed, Santoso himself was radicalised during this conflict following the Walisongo 
massacre in May 2000 leading him to join the local mujahidin affiliated with JI. From 2010 
onwards MIT fought a jihad against the Indonesian police from its stronghold in the Poso 
mountains.
121
 Between 2011 and 2015, MIT also established training camps not only for their 
followers, but also an array of Indonesian jihadi groups.  
The case of MIT clearly illustrates how international jihadi ideology was deliberately 
imported. It is also a perfect example of local dynamics becoming intertwined with global 
ones. Santoso first reached out to Al-Qaeda’s Global Islamic Media Front and then to ISIS to 
elevate the Poso jihad beyond the parochial, in order to attract funding, and to enhance his 
own credentials. After Santoso’s bai’at to Baghdadi in 2013, MIT began adopting the black 
flag of the Islamic State on its media statements and videos,
122
 had its own link person to ISIS 
in Bagus Maskuron, who left for Syria in November 2013,
123
 and Indonesian police believe 
that MIT received logistical support from ISIS, most notably money to purchase weapons 
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from the Philippines.
124
 MIT’s fighting force, which numbered around 30 persons including 
three women, was also augmented by several Uighur foreign fighters who had been directed 
to Poso via contacts in the broader international ISIS network. Until the death of Santoso in 
July 2016, MIT was the clearest Indonesian example of ‘importing’ ISIS to serve local 
needs.
125
  
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the motivations of Indonesians and Malaysians for going to 
Syria, the appeal of the ISIS ideology and Caliphate, patterns of ISIS recruitment, the 
Southeast Asian battalion in Syria, and the ISIS network in Indonesia and Malaysia from a 
comparative perspective.  It looked at how, where, and why the transnational and local 
intersected. It argued that it was exactly because of this process of ‘glocalisation’ that the 
eschatological and sectarian ideology and narratives of ISIS were deemed valid as they were 
viewed through the local lens, adapted to – and by – local conditions. Indonesians and 
Malaysians were not simply lured into joining ISIS as a result of its ‘universal’ ideology, its 
slick propaganda, and its global recruitment strategy. Local political and religious dynamics 
played a key role in creating a conducive and facilitative environment. On the religious level 
this environment was created by pre-existing and on-going debates on what it means to be a 
‘good Muslim’, the place of Islamic law in society, and relations within the ummah as well as 
with non-Muslims. On the political level, this environment was the result of the absence of 
the state in this debate in Indonesia which provided an entry point for ISIS ideology. In 
contrast, in Malaysia it was the presence of the state which inadvertently contributed to the 
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pro-ISIS radicalisation through the Islamisation of politics in ways that resonated with 
elements of ISIS’s ideology and agenda.  
These observations are significant given the tendency in much of the analysis on ISIS 
to favour the structural appeal of its narrative of global jihad at the expense of a deeper 
appreciation of local conditions that, as this article has shown, has led to the ‘indigenisation’ 
of this narrative. The diffused nature of receptivity to the ISIS narrative and the importance of 
local factors has been made further evident in this comparative study, where Indonesia and 
Malaysia have differed in terms of recruitment patterns and the nature of its appeal - the 
efficacy of the internet for recruitment and indoctrination in Malaysia juxtaposed against the 
role that traditional networks play in Indonesia, for instance. 
While it is important to understand the local Southeast Asian dynamics in order to 
ascertain why ISIS enjoyed appeal in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is also useful to place 
Indonesia and Malaysia into the broader context. Here it is perhaps necessary to consider why 
there were not more Indonesians and Malaysians who joined the Syrian jihad. Geographical 
distance is an obvious factor.  Indonesia and Malaysia – indeed, the entire Southeast Asian 
region – is geographically far removed from the conflict zone in Syria.  This made it 
logistically difficult for ISIS sympathisers to realise aspirations to be a physical participant in 
the Syrian jihad. It also made it more expensive, which explains the onerous lengths to which 
Indonesians in particular have had to go in order to raise the funds required to finance their 
hijrah to Syria. In fact, this factor was acknowledged by ISIS central, which called for 
Southeast Asians to wage jihad locally in the event they could not make the hijrah to the 
Islamic State territories. 
 A second factor that accounts for the difficulty that Indonesians and Malaysians faced 
in participating in the Syrian jihad is the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in both 
countries. This is especially so in Malaysia, which has a long and well established tradition of 
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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations bolstered by strong internal security 
legislation that is currently absent in the Indonesian legal system. And last, but certainly not 
least, the Islamisation of politics in both Indonesia and Malaysia, and in particular the 
growing influence of Islamist proponents of the implementation of Syariah in both countries, 
has provided considerable opportunities for above-ground pro-Syariah activities that have 
achieved far more than the sporadic violence carried out by ISIS cells, let alone ISIS-inspired 
lone wolves. 
 It is clear from this study then that the potency and appeal of the extremist narrative of 
ISIS in Southeast Asia derives from how it animated and fed off prevailing debates. While 
the structuralist and universalist ideology and narrative of ISIS continues to capture the 
headlines, careful consideration and contextualization of extremist activity in the region has 
shown that those who have sympathized, expressed support for, and left to join the ISIS jihad 
were in fact significantly propelled by local dynamics into which the phenomenon of ISIS 
was ‘imported’ and ‘indigenized’. 
 
 
 
